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I. Introduction 
The principal purpose of this paper is to consider the extent to which a State 
incurs responsibility under international law for acts of its armed forces which 
cause environmental damage, and to examine whether State responsibility 
provides a sufficiently effective means for enforcing the law regarding protection 
of the environment in armed conflict. The emphasis will be upon international 
armed conflicts, although there will also be a brief discussion of the position in 
internal armed conflicts and in certain types of United Nations operations. As a 
secondary concern, the paper will also consider the possibility of a State, or 
individuals or agencies acting on behalf of a State, being held liable in domestic 
law for damage to the environment caused by military operations. 
Part II of this paper will review the principles of State responsibility for 
environmental damage in the context of the law of armed conflict. Part III will 
then examine the application of those principles by the United Nations 
Compensation Commission in the case of Iraq. The possibility of State 
responsibility for environmental damage occurring in internal armed conflicts and 
United Nations operations will be discussed in Part IV. Part V will consider certain 
issues of civil liability under domestic law. Finally, Part VI will advance certain 
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of State responsibility and civil liability in 
protecting the environment. 
II. The Principles of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage in 
International Armed Conflict 
A. State Responsibility and International Environmental Obligations 
The starting point for this inquiry is that where the agents of a State cause 
environmental damage by conduct which is contrary to a rule of international law 
binding upon that State, the ~tate incurs international responsibility. It is a long 
established principle of international law that 'every internationally wrongful act 
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of a State entails the international responsibility of that State'. 1 According to the 
International Law Commission, 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when: 
(a) conduct consisting of an act or omission is attributable to the State under 
international law; and 
(b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.2 
This principle applies to breaches by a State of its international obligations 
relating to the environment, just as much as it does to breaches of other 
international obligations.3 Indeed, the International Law Commission has 
categorized 'a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance 
for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment' as conduct 
which may give rise to an international crime.4 Whether the Commission's 
attempt to create a concept of State crimes separate from other breaches by States 
of their international obligations will prove acceptable, and whether it will actually 
make any difference to the substantive law (as opposed to such issues as the 
standing to bring a claim), is debatable. What matters for present purposes is the 
clear recognition that a State incurs responsibility under international law for the 
. breach of its environmental obligations. 
It is, however, widely recognized that as a means of ensuring protection of the 
environment, State responsibility is subject to severe limitations.5 While there 
have been cases in which a State has brought a claim for environmental damage 
caused to its own territory or interests, it is unclear which State, if any, has standing 
to maintain an international claim regarding damage to the global commons.6 The 
concept of an actio popularis has not yet gained sufficient acceptance in 
international law. Moreover, although this problem may be eased if the concept 
of causing serious pollution as an international crime comes to be accepted (since 
every State could then claim to be entitled to enforce the obligations concerned), 
this effect has yet to be felt and may be outweighed by other problems inherent in 
the concept of State crimes. In addition, proof of causation is often particularly 
difficult in environmental cases. Finally, there is considerable argument about the 
standard of responsibility (strict, absolute or fault based) in many of the treaties 
on the environment. The result is that State responsibility, while not to be 
dismissed, is not regarded as the most important means of enforcing international 
environmental law. Instead, attention has tended to shift towards preventive 
measures, such as the requirement to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment, and supervisory action by international organizations. 
It should also be mentioned that the International Law Commission has 
adopted a series of articles, distinct from those on State responsibility, which deal 
with the 'notion that a State may incur liability for the injurious consequences of 
lawful acts? Whereas State responsibility is based upon the thesis that a State 
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incurs certain obligations because it has done something unlawful, liability under 
the new articles will not be dependent upon the act which gives rise to the injurious 
consequences being characterized as unlawful. The new concept is likely to be of 
particular significance in the environmental field but has proved controversial. 8 
B. State Responsibility and Obligations under the Law of Anned Conflict 
The armed forces of a State are clearly one of the 'organs' of the State and when 
members of the armed forces of the State act in their official capacity, their conduct 
is attributable to the State. If, therefore, that conduct is contrary to an international 
obligation of the State, then the responsibility of the State is engaged. It was never 
contested, for example, that France incurred international responsibility as a result 
of the actions of French special forces in destroying the vessel Rainbow Warrior in 
New Zealand in July 1985.9 
The fact that the State is engaged in an armed conflict and that the obligation 
which is violated is one derived from the law of armed conflict, rather than the 
law of peace, does not in any way prevent the State from being held responsible. 
Although the law of armed conflict is unusual in international law in holding 
individuals criminally responsible for violations of its rules, 'individual 
responsibility is additional to, and not exclusive of, the responsibility of the 
governments concerned.'lO The responsibility of the State for violations of the 
laws of armed conflict committed by its armed forces is expressly provided for in 
Article 3 of Hague Convention No. IV, 1907, and Article 91 of Additional Protocol 
1,1977, which are discussed below. 
There are several rules of the law of armed conflict which expressly concern 
the environment and the violation of which will entail international responsibility 
on the part of the State concerned: 11 
(1) the Environmental Modification Treaty, 1977, (ENMOD)12 prohibits the 
use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as a means of warfare; 
(2) Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol 1,13 prohibit the use of methods 
and means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the environment; 
(3) customary international law is widely considered to include a prohibition 
on unnecessary and wanton destruction of the environment and a requirement 
that a belligerent show due regard for the protection of the environment.14 Some 
commentators also maintain that the proportionality principle applies in this 
context, so that a military operation is prohibited if it is probable that it will result 
in damage to the environment which is excessive in relation to the military gain 
which the operation is expected to produce.IS 
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In addition, a number of rules which are not specifically directed towards 
environmental protection have important repercussions for the environment. 
Chief among these are the following: 
(4) the prohibition on wanton destruction of property, that is to say, destruction 
not demanded by the necessities of war; 16 
(5) the prohibition on the use of chemical and biological weapons, both of which 
are capable of devastating environmental effects;17 
(6) the restrictions placed on the use of mines, booby-traps and incendiary 
weapons;18 
(7) the prohibition of attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population, such as foodstuffs and drinking water; 19 and 
(8) the prohibition (except in certain narrowly defined circumstances) of attacks 
upon works and installations containing hazardous forces, such as nuclear 
electrical generating stations.20 
Conduct which is imputable to a State engaged in an international armed 
conflict and which is contrary to any of these rules will engage the international 
responsibility of that State, provided, of course, that that rule is applicable to that 
State in the conflict in question.21 In addition, it is open to argument that some 
of the provisions of environmental agreements not specifically concerned with 
armed conflict remain applicable in armed conflict and thus impose further 
restraints, the disregard of which by the armed forces of a State may engage that 
State's international responsibility. A belligerent may incur international 
responsibility for damage to the environmental rights of another belligerent or a 
neutral State. The same difficulties exist here regarding standing to claim in 
respect of damage to global commons. 
C. Special Features of State Responsibility in the Context of International 
Armed Conflict 
In one respect, the concept of responsibility for violations of the law of armed 
conflict goes beyond the normal principles of State responsibility. Article 3 of 
Hague Convention IV states: 
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts 
committed by members of its armed forces.22 
Similarly, Article 91 of Additional Protocol I provides: 
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.23 
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In each case, the first sentence merely states the well established principle that 
a State is internationally responsible for the acts of its officials, members of its 
armed forces and other 'organs' of the State which are imputable to it. The actions 
of an organ of the State are imputable to that State if the organ in question was 
acting in its capacity as an organ of the State but not otherwise.24 This principle 
has generally been given a broad interpretation, so that arbitral tribunals have held 
a State responsible for acts which were ultra vires provided that the soldiers in 
question acted, at least apparently, as organs of the State. Thus, the United 
States-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission held in the Youmans claim that: 
Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or committing wanton destruction or looting 
always act in disobedience to some rules laid down by superior authority. There could 
be no liability whatever for such misdeeds if the view were taken that any acts 
committed by soldiers in contravention of instructions must always be considered 
as personal acts,25 
Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that, under the general rules of State 
responsibility, a State is not internationally responsible for wholly unofficial, 
private acts which it was not negligent in failing to prevent. 
The second sentence of Article 3 of Hague Convention IV and Article 91 of 
Additional Protocol I thus go beyond this general rule by providing that, in the 
context of armed conflict, a belligerent State is responsible for 'all acts committed 
by persons forming part of its armed forces'. The use of the word 'all' suggests that 
responsibility under this provision extends to that category of wholly unofficial, 
unauthorized acts of members of the armed forces for which the State would not 
otherwise be internationally responsible. That interpretation is confirmed by the 
travaux preparatoires of the Hague Convention, the records of the Second Hague 
Peace Conference of 1907. The second sentence of Article 3 was the result of an 
amendment proposed by the German delegation to the Conference. Introducing 
the amendment, the German delegate, Major General von Gundell, identified the 
problem with which the amendment was designed to deal: 
The case most frequently occurring will be that in which no negligence is chargeable 
to the Government itself. Ifin this case persons injured as a consequence of violation 
of the Regulations could not demand reparation from the Government and were 
obliged to look to the officer or soldier at fault, they would fail in the majority of cases 
to obtain the indemnification due them. We think, therefore, that the responsibility 
for every unlawful act committed in violation of the Regulations by persons forminl 
part of the armed forces should rest with the Governments to which they belong.2 
It seems clear, therefore, both from the text and the drafting history, that the 
second sentence of Article 3 was intended to make a State responsible for all 
violations of the Hague Regulations committed by members of its armed forces, 
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even where those violations were completely unauthorized private acts. That has 
been the interpretation placed upon Article 3 by most commentators. Thus, Judge 
Freeman wrote that: 
... Article 3, as I read it, declares that a State shall be responsible for all the acts of 
its soldiers which violate the provisions of the Regulations. No distinction is made 
between acts committed within the exercise of military duties and non-official actsP 
Professor Kalshoven has taken the same view: 
... Article 3 is broader [than the general law] in that it encompasses all violations of 
the Regulations committed by persons belonging to the armed forces irrespective of 
whether these were done in that capacity or otherwise. The point is relevant because 
members of an armed force at war stand a greater chance than do other State organs 
of becoming entangled in ambiguous situations where it may be unclear whether 
they were acting in their capacity as an organ of the State. What, for instance, of the 
incidents that allegedly happened in the course of the invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait: can all acts of wanton brutality or savagery done by members ofthe Iraqi 
army be regarded as committed in that capacityi 8 
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I is in the same terms as Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention and was clearly intended to have the same broad scope. Where it may, 
perhaps, differ is that the draftsmen of Article 3 seem to have contemplated mainly 
direct claims by individuals, rather than State to State claims, for wrongs done by 
identifiable servicemen, rather than injuries caused by, for example, long range 
bombardment.29 These liII).itations were clearly not envisaged when Article 91 of 
Additional Protocol I was adopted. Both provisions were drafted with claims by 
neutral States, as well as by belligerents, in mind. While the basic principle that a 
State is responsible for violations of the law of armed conflict committed by 
members of its armed forces is undoubtedly part of customary law, and thus 
applicable to violation of all rules of the law of armed conflict irrespective of their 
source, it is open to debate whether the extended concept of responsibility for 
wholly private acts recognized in Article 3 of Hague Convention IV and Article 
91 of Additional Protocol I applies to breaches of rules not contained in those two 
treaties. 
It follows, therefore, that a State which is a party to an international armed 
conflict will incur international responsibility for damage to the environment 
caused by acts of members of its armed forces if those acts are in breach of one of 
the rules set out in the preceding section of this paper. If the rule is contained in 
the Hague Regulations or Additional Protocol I, responsibility will be engaged 
even if the servicemen in question were acting wholly outside the scope of their 
official duties and this was obvious to all concerned. If, therefore, fleeing soldiers 
from an army in which all discipline had collapsed set fire to oil installations in 
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the course oflooting and thus caused damage to the environment, this act would 
engage the responsibility of their State as a result of Article 3 of Hague Convention 
IV and, if applicable, Article 91 of Additional Protocol I, even if the State would 
not have been held responsible under the normal principles set out in the 
International Law Commission's draft. 
Although there have been cases in which one belligerent has paid compensation 
to another (or to its nationals) for damage caused by violations of the laws of armed 
conflict-usually as a result of the treaties concluded at the end of the Second World 
War-effective reliance on the principles of State responsibility in this area have 
been rare since then. There have been a number of occasions on which a belligerent 
has paid compensation, usually without admission of liability, to a neutral State 
for damage caused by its armed forces. The United States, for example, received 
compensation from Israel for the attack on the USS Liberty in 1967 and from Iraq 
for the attack on the USS Stark in 1987. The United States also offered an ex gratia 
payment to the families of those killed when the USS Vincennes shot down a civil 
airliner in 1988 at a time when United States forces were engaged in fighting with 
Iranian forces.30 On the whole, however, State responsibility has not proved a 
particularly effective means of enforcing the law of armed conflict. 
D. State Responsibility for Aggression 
It is important to bear in mind that State responsibility is also incurred when 
a State violates those rules of international law which prohibit recourse to force 
against another State, in particular Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. As 
a result, a State is liable, in principle, to pay compensation for damage, including 
environmental damage, caused by an unlawful resort to force. That is so even if 
the act which was the immediate cause of the damage was not itself a violation of 
the laws of armed conflict. 
Suppose, for example, that a State invades its neighbor in circumstances which 
could not possibly justify a plea of self-defense, so that there is a clear violation of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter. In the course of the fighting which ensues, the armed 
forces of the invader destroy an installation which is a military objective (and thus 
a lawful target under the laws of armed conflict). This action causes extensive 
pollution but does not violate Articles 35(3) or 55 of Additional Protocol I, because 
the damage to the environment is not 'long-term', and does not violate any of the 
other principles considered in Part II.B, above, because the destruction of the 
installation was militarily necessary. In such a case, those individuals who carried 
out the attack would not be guilty of a war crime or grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions; but the State could be held responsible for the damage because it 
was a direct consequence of the illegal invasion. State responsibility here flows 
from a breach not of the jus in bello but of the jus ad bellum. International claims 
on this basis have been very rare since 1945. The United Kingdom and Argentina, 
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for example, agreed in 1989 to make no claims against each other in respect of the 
1982 Falklands Conflict, notwithstanding the clear illegality of Argentina's 
invasion and the scale of the damage to the Falklands environment caused by 
Argentine mining.31 The outstanding exception is the response of the 
international community to the damage resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
which will be the subject of the following section. 
III. The Responsibility of Iraq for Damage Resulting from the Invasion 
of Kuwait 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was perhaps the clearest violation of Article 2(4) of 
the Charter between 1945 and 1990 and was condemned as such by the Security 
Council.32 Although some of the more apocalyptic predictions regarding the 
effects of the Kuwait Conflict of 1990-91 on the environment proved to be 
exaggerated, there is no doubt that the conflict caused extensive damage to the 
environment in and around the Gulf.33 These consequences are considered in 
greater detail in some of the other papers.34 It is sufficient here to note that 
attention has tended to focus on three types of environmental damage: 
(1) damage to the marine environment caused by the release oflarge quantities 
of oil by Iraq from the Sea Island Terminal in Kuwait; 
(2) damage to the environment over a wide area resulting from the burning by 
Iraqi forces of over 500 oil wells in Kuwait; and 
(3) land degradation caused by the aerial bombardment, the creation of 
minefields, the construction of other defensive fortifications such as trenches, and 
the land campaign. The conduct of both Iraqi and Coalition forces contributed to 
this category of damage. 
A. The Jurisdiction of the Compensation Commission 
The Security Council took an early position on the responsibility of Iraq for 
damage caused by violations of international law. Paragraph 8 of Security Council 
Resolution 674 (1990) reminded Iraq: 
that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard 
to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the 
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq 
and invited States to collect information about potential claims. Resolution 687 
(1991), adopted after the end of the fighting, reaffirmed in paragraph 16 that: 
Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign 
governments, nationals and corporations, as a result ofIraq's unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait. 
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Resolution 687 went on to provide for the establishment of a compensation 
commission to administer a fund from which claims against Iraq would be paid. 
The money to pay compensation was to come from a levy on Iraqi oil sales. 
Following a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of this part 
of Resolution 687,35 the Security Council established the United Nations 
Compensation Commission by Resolution 692 (1991).36 
The Commission is not a court but a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, 
operating 'an essentially administrative mass claims system,.37 In many respects 
it departs-sometimes radically-from the classical principles of State 
responsibility. Nevertheless, it is based, as paragraph 16 of Resolution 687 makes 
clear, on the principle that Iraq is internationally responsible for the damage 
caused by its unlawful acts. Its work, therefore, gives a rare and valuable insight 
into State responsibility for military operations. Moreover, the express provision 
in Resolution 687 for claims regarding environmental damage makes the 
Commission of particular interest in the context of this paper. 
In view of the volume of claims-2.6 million claims for a total of approximately 
U.S. $174 billion had been filed by April 1995 and there are more to come-and 
the very limited funds so far available to it,38 the Commission has given priority 
to claims by individuals. It has, however, given an indication of how it intends to 
proceed with the environmental claims. The overwhelming majority of the 
environmental claims are likely to be submitted by governments and international 
organizations. In Decision No. 7 (Revision 1) of March 1992, the Governing 
Council of the Commission held that payments were in principle available: 
with respect to any direct loss, damage, or injury to governments or international 
organizations as a result ofIraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. This 
will include any loss suffered as a result of: 
(a) military operations or threat of military action by either side during the period 2 
August 1990 to 2 March 1991; 
(b) departure of persons from, or their inability to leave, Iraq or Kuwait (or a decision 
not to return) during that period; 
(c) actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government ofIraq or its controlled 
entities during that period in connection with the invasion or occupation; 
(d) the breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq during that period; or 
(e) hostage-taking or other illegal detention.39 
With regard to environmental claims, the the Governing Council decided: 
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These payments are available with respect to direct environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources as a result ofIraq's unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait. This will include losses or expenses resulting from: 
(a) abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly 
relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international 
waters; 
(b) reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future 
measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the 
environment; 
(c) reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the 
purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment; 
(d) reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for 
the purposes of investigation and combatting increased health risks as a result of 
environmental damage; and 
(e) depletion of or damage to natural resources.40 
The Commission has set a deadline of 1 February 1997 for filing claims for 
environmental damage.41 It is impossible, therefore, to assess the size of these 
claims, although it has been suggested that Kuwait's claim in respect of the oil 
well fires may reach U.S. $170 billion on its own.42 The Governing Council has 
adopted the following provision on the law to be applied by the Commissioners 
in dealing with claims: 
In considering the claims, Commissioners will apply Security Council Resolution 
687 (1991) and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, the criteria established 
by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims, and any pertinent 
decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where necessary, Commissioners 
shall apply other relevant rules of international law.43 
B. The Basis of Iraq's Responsibility 
Although the Commission has yet to deal with any of the environmental claims, 
a number of features of the system which has been established merit attention at 
this stage. First, the central principle in Resolution 687 and Decision No.7 of the 
Governing Council is that the wrongful act which has engaged Iraq's State 
responsibility under international law is the illegal invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Kuwait, i.e., the violation of Article 2(4) ofthe Charter and other 
norms prohibiting international aggression, not violations of the law of armed 
conflict. As one commentator has put it: 
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. . . the key causal factor giving rise to liability is the unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait. Liability thus exists even in cases where the individual act of 
an Iraqi agent, taken in isolation, would not constimte a violation of international 
law.44 
If, therefore, damage was caused by Iraqi soldiers in circumstances which did 
not amount to a violation of the law of armed conflict, Iraq would still bear 
international responsibility because the damage was a direct result of the illegal 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The responsibility ofIraq is thus considerably 
more extensive than the criminal responsibility of individual Iraqi servicemen, 
who were guilty of war crimes only if they acted contrary to the laws of armed 
conflict and who are not penalized merely because their State was guilty of 
aggression.4S There is, however, an exception to the principle that Iraq is liable 
for the consequences of aggression irrespective of whether the laws of armed 
conflict were also violated in the case of claims by members of the Coalition armed 
forces. The Governing Council has decided that Coalition servicemen are entitled 
to compensation only if they were prisoners of war and suffered treatment contrary 
to international humanitarian law.46 Claims by Coalition servicemen for injuries 
sustained as a result of the pollution caused by the oil well fires are therefore 
excluded. 
The fact that Iraq's responsibility is based upon its violation of the jus ad 
bellum rather than thejus in bello may prove to be of considerable importance 
in respect of the claims for environmental damage. If claimants were required 
to show that the environmental damage was caused by acts which violated the 
law of armed conflict, they would have faced a difficult task. Iraq was not a 
party to ENMOD or Additional Protocol I. Since the provisions of ENMOD 
and the environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I are probably not 
yet declaratory of customary internationallaw,47 those provisions were not 
applicable. While a good case can nevertheless be made that much of the 
destruction committed by Iraq in the oil fields and the release of the oil slick 
from the Sea Island terminal were contrary to the prohibition on wanton 
destruction, it is far from clear that all of those acts of destruction lacked a 
justification in military necessity. Ifit was decided that even some of those acts 
were not contrary to the law of armed conflict, it would have become necessary 
to show that any damage in respect of which a claim was made was caused by 
those acts which were unlawful, rather than by those which were not, or to have 
persuaded the Commissioners that they could apply some concept of 
apportioning liability. The decision that Iraq is to be held responsible for 
environmental damage directly resulting from the invasion and occupation 
(particularly when one considers the implementation of that decision in 
paragraphs 34 and 35 of Decision No.7) avoids the need to, decide those 
questions. 
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C. The Requirement of 'Direct' Loss 
Secondly, the requirement that damage or loss be a direct consequence of the 
invasion or occupation may prove a fertile field for legal argument and has already 
attracted controversy.48 Although the reference to direct loss or damage is not a 
novelty, it has often given rise to difficulty in the past. The Arbitrator in a 1923 
case, for example, said that "the distinction sought to be made between damages 
which are direct and those which are indirect is frequently illusory and fanciful 
and should have no place in international law.,,49 Since proof of causation is 
frequently problematic in cases involving claims for environmental damage, it is 
likely that the requirement that damage be 'direct' will create particular difficulties 
for governments presenting environmental claims to the Commission. 
The decisions of the Governing Council have, however, gone some way to 
clarifying the concept of directness in relation to such claims. Thus, paragraph 35 
of Decision No.7, which is quoted above, gives a clear indication ofthe types of 
loss and damage which are likely to be treated as direct consequences of the oil 
spill and the burning of the oil wells, both of which actions are clearly imputable 
to Iraq and were undeniably consequences of the invasion and occupation. The 
emphasis on recovery of the reasonable costs of the operations to clean and restore 
the environment, and of monitoring environmental damage and effects upon 
health, is particularly welcome. 
So far as the damage caused by land degradation is concerned, the decision in 
paragraph 34 that Iraq is responsible for the direct loss and damage caused by the 
military operations of both Iraqi and coalition forces is particularly relevant. 
Although most of the damage done by the Coalition occurred in Iraq itself, and 
neither Iraq nor its nationals can present claims in respect thereof, some of the 
damage in Kuwait was caused by the Coalition or cannot readily be attributed to 
one side rather than the other. The decision to treat the Coalition's military 
operations as a direct result of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and 
thus to hold Iraq responsible for the damage which those operations caused is one 
of the more important consequences of the Security Council's initial decision that 
the basis of Iraqi responsibility was its violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, 
rather than the laws of armed conflict. 
D. Conclusion 
It is clear that if it deals with the environmental claims, the Commission is 
likely to hold that Iraq is responsible for most of the environmental damage which 
occurred as a result of the events in the Gulf in 1990-91. Some claims will 
undoubtedly fail the 'directness' requirement. That will be so where, for example, 
it is not sufficiently established that atmospheric pollution some distance from 
Kuwait was in fact caused by the burning of the oil wells. Where causation is 
established, the position would seem to be as follows: 
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(1) Iraq is responsible for damage to the environment caused by the acts ofIraqi 
agents, irrespective of whether that damage involved a violation of the laws of 
armed conflict; 
(2) Iraq is responsible for damage to the environment caused by acts of Iraqi 
servicemen, even if those servicemen were acting in a wholly private capacity, such 
as private soldiers looting and destroying property in their retreat. Such damage 
would still be covered by paragraph 34 (c) or (d) of Decision No.7, as well as by 
Article 3 of Hague Convention IV if the destruction was contrary to the rules stated 
in the Hague Regulations; 
(3) Iraq is responsible for damage to the environment the proximate cause of 
which was Coalition military operations which were lawfully directed against Iraq 
in order to end its illegal occupation of Kuwait, e.g., a lawful air attack against a 
military objective in Kuwait which resulted in air or marine pollution; 
(4) It is less clear whether Iraq can be held responsible for environmental 
damage caused by Coalition operations if the act which was the immediate cause 
of the damage was itself a violation of the laws of armed conflict, e.g., if pollution 
was caused by a Coalition attack which did not observe the customary law 
requirements of protection of the environment or which involved wanton 
destruction contrary to Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations. While there may 
not (and should not) have been any cases in this category, it is suggested that, as 
a matter of principle, an aggressor should not be held internationally responsible 
for unlawful conduct on the part of its adversaries, not least because that would 
actually be contrary to the objective of ensuring that State responsibility operated 
to ensure compliance with the law, rather than simply to provide compensation 
for the consequences of its violation. Unlawful Coalition conduct should not, in 
other words, be treated as a direct result of the Iraqi invasion or occupation of 
Kuwait. 
Finally, while it is to be hoped that the Commission will eventually resolve the 
environmental claims and have the funds to ensure that its awards are paid, it must 
be questioned whether that will actually be the case. By April 1995, the 
Commission had approved awards of U.S. $870 million but had been able to 
arrange payments totalling only U.S. $2.75 million. As governmental claims with 
a late filing date, the environmental claims will, in any event, come towards the 
end of a very long queue. Moreover, the size and complexity of these claims 
suggests that many of them may not be resolved by the Commission until well into 
the Twenty-First Century. Even then, there may not be the money to pay any 
awards which are approved. If Iraq were to resume oil sales at the pre-war level, 
the Commission might have some U.S. $6 billion a year with which to meet claims. 
It seems likely that the total amounts claimed may well come to some U.S. $400 
billion. Even if the Commission awards only half that amount, it would still take 
over thirty years to honor all those awards. It seems probable, therefore, that a 
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compromise settlement will be negotiated at some stage, if the environmental 
claims are not to fall by the wayside in their entirety. 
IV. State Responsibility for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed 
Conflicts and United Nations Operations 
A. Internal Armed Conflicts 
Internal armed conflicts raise rather different questions. International law 
regarding internal armed conflicts contains fewer rules regarding the 
environment.50 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not mention 
the environment or destruction of property. Additional Protocol 11,1977, contains 
no provisions comparable to Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I, 
although Articles 14 and 15 of Additional Protocol II deal with attacks on articles 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and works containing 
hazardous forces, and thus have environmental implications.51 The Hague 
Regulations, 1907, and the Conventional Weapons Convention, 1980,52 are 
applicable only to international armed conflicts. It is far from clear whether there 
is any customary law principle regarding the environment which applies to the 
parties in an internal armed conflict. 
It is probable, therefore, that claims that a State was internationally responsible 
for damage to the environment occasioned in an internal armed conflict would be 
brought by other States which had suffered as a result of that conflict and would 
be based on general environmental treaties and principles of customary law, rather 
than the laws of armed conflict. It is also possible that a State which wantonly 
damaged the environment within its own jurisdiction to the detriment of its 
population might face action under one of the human rights treaties.53 
Environmental damage caused by an insurgent movement would engage State 
responsibility only if the movement went on to become the government of that 
State.54 
B. United Nations Operations 
When United Nations forces engage as combatants in an armed conflict, they 
are subject to the laws of armed conflict, as are national forces operating, as in the 
Gulf, under a mandate from the Security Council but under national command 
and control. In the latter case, no special questions of State responsibility arise. If 
Coalition forces in the Gulfhad caused environmental damage by acts which were 
contrary to the laws of armed conflict, they would have engaged the responsibility 
of their own States. Whether the conduct of forces from one Coalition State would 
have engaged the responsibility of its allies in addition must be regarded as 
unsettled.55 There is no history of allied powers being held jointly responsible in 
this way but in principle joint responsibility should not be excluded where, for 
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example, aircraft from one State carry out an unlawful attack at the behest of a 
commander from an allied State. 
A more difficult situation arises where unlawful acts are committed by forces 
under United Nations command. The nature of many modern United Nations 
operations, such as those in Somalia and the former-Yugoslavia, which are neither 
traditional peacekeeping nor straightforward enforcement actions, further 
complicates the picture. Two problems may briefly be mentioned: 
(1) what law applies to military operations by United Nations forces when it is 
denied that those forces are a party to a conflict but they are nevertheless involved 
in fighting? Although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
argued that once such forces become involved in fighting, the laws of armed 
conflict become applicable to them, it is far from clear that State practice supports 
this view. It does not appear, for example, to have been the view taken by States 
in respect of the fighting by UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The 1994 Convention on the 
Protection of United Nations Personnel56 also seems to envisage that United 
Nations forces and associated personnel may become involved in hostilities at a 
level below the threshold for application to them of the laws of armed conflict. 
(2) is a State internationally responsible for the acts ofits servicemen when they 
form part ofa United Nations force? Both the United Nations and the State may 
be lawful claimants in respect of wrongs done to such servicemen.57 The general 
view has been, however, that it is the United Nations, not the contributing State, 
which is the appropriate defendant in cases where U.N. forces have violated the 
law in the course of their official duties.58 Had it proceeded with the action which 
it threatened to bring against the United Kingdom in 1993, Bosnia might have 
attempted to argue otherwise. One problem in this respect is that the boundary 
line between troops under U.N. command and troops engaged in a U.N. operation 
but under national or alliance command and control has become blurred in recent 
years. If a national contingent which is part of a United Nations force conducts a 
particular attack because of national, rather than U.N. orders, international 
responsibility for any violation of the law would appear to rest with the State rather 
than the United Nations. 
V. Civil Liability Under National Law 
Civil actions by individuals against individual polluters have in some respects 
become more important than State responsibility in enforcing general 
environmental law. The possibility of a civil action in a national court for 
environmental damage in time of armed conflict has not, however, received much 
attention. It is not difficult to see why. Unlike most polluting activities, the 
military operations which cause environmental or other damage in wartime are 
performed by agents of the State. If that State or its agents were sued in the courts 
of another State, they would normally be entitled to sovereign immunity. 59 Even 
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if the defendant were not immune, the act of State doctrine would bar 
consideration of the merits of the claim in some jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of a civil action should not be altogether excluded. 
Many States now make an exception to sovereign immunity for torts committed 
outside their jurisdiction but which cause damage within the jurisdiction.60 If, 
therefore, the release of oil into the sea off the coast of State A caused damage to 
beaches in State B, the courts of State B might well hold that the exception to 
immunity was applicable. The recent decision of the House of Lords in Kuwait 
Air Corporation v. Iraq Airways Co.,61 though not concerning environmental 
damage, also suggests that the English courts may be readier than in the past to 
separate the act which was the proximate cause of damage from the context of 
armed conflict in which it took place. The act of State doctrine, the possible 
application of which in the KuwaitAirways Case has yet to be decided, is construed 
more broadly by courts in the United States, where it reflects constitutional 
concerns, than in many other States. It is possible, therefore, that civil actions may 
come to playa more important part. 
VI. Conclusion 
The principle that if the armed forces of a State cause damage to the 
environment of other States by acts which are a violation of the laws of armed 
conflict, then the State incurs responsibility under international law is clear. Such 
a State is thus exposed to claims for compensation which may involve enormous 
amounts of money, as well as claims for other remedies and the possibility of 
retaliatory action. In theory, this possibility should operate as a significant 
deterrent. State responsibility is listed first amongst the methods of ensuring 
compliance with the rules of the law of armed conflict on the environment in the 
1993 Report submitted by the Secretary-General but prepared by the ICRC.62 So 
far, however, there is little sign that it has had such an effect. As with the protection 
of the environment in peacetime, State responsibility has a role to play but that 
role has hitherto been peripheral. It is possible that the work of the United Nations 
Compensation Commission may change all that. If the Commission succeeds in 
forcing Iraq to pay a substantial sum for the damage which Iraq wrought upon the 
environment, States may take their environmental obligations in time of armed 
conflict more seriously. The odds are, however, heavily stacked against such a 
result and the longer that the process takes, the less its deterrent value is likely to 
be. Civil liability for environmental damage in armed conflict is still in its infancy. 
While we should not, therefore, ignore the role that these concepts may have to 
play, it would be unwise to place much reliance upon them. 
On the other hand, the precautionary measures, such as the conduct of 
environmental impact assessments, which have become so important in protecting 
the environment in time of peace, are ill-suited to conditions of armed conflict. 
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The most that might be expected here is that the obligation under Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I to review new weapons in order to determine whether their 
use would comply with the law of armed conflict will come to embrace the 
environmental dimension of that law. In practice, it is in the field of education 
and training and the application of political pressure upon belligerents that the 
best hope lies. As one of the leading textbooks states, what needs to be emphasized 
is the importance of making environmental consequences a serious concern in 
military decisions.63 It is unlikely that this will be achieved through the 
application of the principles of State responsibility. 
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